Power generation firms confront impending replacement of an aging coal-fired generation fleet in a business environment characterized by volatile natural gas prices and uncertain future regulation of carbon dioxide. We develop a stochastic dynamic programming model of firm investment decisions that minimizes the expected present value of future power generation costs under both CO 2 regulation and natural gas price uncertainties to examine generation technology choice and the optimal timing of investment. Our analysis focuses on several interrelated questions relevant to both capital investment decisions by electricity generation firms and carbon/climate policymaking decisions by regulators over the next few decades. How does the threat of future restrictions on carbon emissions affect current private investment decisions? Does regulatory uncertainty combined with irreversible investment create an incentive to delay retirement of existing coal plants with associated power generation cost and pollution consequences? How valuable is the flexibility that arises from building IGCC plants for which the cost of later CCS retrofits is comparatively small? What is the social cost of delaying policy decisions about carbon constraints? How is the cost effectiveness of CO 2 reductions influenced by regulatory uncertainty and the flexibility provided by CCS retrofits?
Introduction
Restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions (CO 2 ) from electric power generation are widely anticipated 1 , yet despite growing concern about climate change, the timing and stringency of future regulations remain deeply uncertain. An aging fleet of coal-fired generation now supplies 51% of U.S. demand, but increasing operating costs as plants age combined with increasingly stringent regulation of conventional pollutants will likely drive the replacement, retirement or refurbishment of much of the coal-fired generation fleet within the next two decades even without constraints on CO 2 emissions.
Switching to natural gas fired generation offers the most readily available means to reduce CO 2 emissions. It provides a cleaner, low-capital-cost alternative to coal-fired
generation, yet conversion to natural gas is inhibited by high and volatile gas prices and expectations of continued volatility and increasing prices (EIA 2005) . Beyond natural gas, options for carbon-constrained electricity supply fall into two broad classes:
centralized electricity production, such as nuclear or CO 2 capture and storage (CCS), and more decentralized alternatives, such as wind power or natural gas cogeneration.
Decentralized technologies may offer cost-effective CO 2 mitigation as well as other diversity and security related benefits, but widespread implementation of these technologies is contingent on changes in transmission infrastructure, electricity markets, and associated regulations (McGowan and Connors 2000; Farrell, Zerriffi et al. 2004; DeCarolis and Keith 2005) .
1 For example, in 2002 and 2003 Granger Morgan of Carnegie Mellon has asked large audiences which included many CEOs and other senior officials in the power industry, "How many of you believe that there will not be Federal controls on CO2 emissions from U.S. power plants within the next 20 years?" In both cases less than 2% of the people in the room raised their hands.
Although nuclear power and CCS are technologically unrelated, they have important similarities from the perspective of electric-sector decision makers. Both could replace existing coal-fired generation providing dispatchable baseload power without requiring significant alteration of existing transmission infrastructures and markets. Both have high capital costs and very low CO 2 emissions. Finally, both involve uncertainties related to citing, regulation, and public acceptance (Morgan 1993; Palmgren, Morgan et al. 2004 ).
Unlike nuclear power, however, CCS technologies can be retrofitted to existing coal-fired power plants. For new coal-fired power plants there is a choice of two technologies: pulverized coal the currently dominant technology and integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC). Absent restrictions on CO 2 emissions, the two technologies have very roughly similar cost and performance characteristics, but IGCC is more technically risky and carries an uncertain cost premium, so absent any other incentive, operators will prefer pulverized coal. However, the possibility of future restrictions on CO 2 emissions can alter this choice because the cost of retrofitting an IGCC plant for CO 2 capture is significantly lower than the cost of retrofitting a pulverized coal plant. The cost premium for an IGCC plant can be viewed as the purchase price of a real option to reduce CO 2 emissions compliance costs in the event of stringent regulations.
We analyze the impacts of uncertainty in the timing and stringency of CO 2 -emission regulations on the investment decisions made by deregulated private firms providing centralized electricity supply and the implications of these decisions on regulatory policy using stochastic-dynamic programming methods. From the firm's perspective, regulatory uncertainty is just one of many uncertain factors under which the firm aims to maximize profits. We restrict our decision model to cost minimization, a necessary condition of profit maximization, to focus on firm generating technology investment choice and the associated implications for CO 2 emissions policy effectiveness. From the regulator's perspective, the timing and stringency of regulations are chosen to maximize net public benefits which we compress into two dimensions: cost of electricity generation and amount of carbon emissions.
We treat uncertainty about carbon policy and natural gas prices explicitly. These are not, of course, the only uncertainties faced by electricity generators and regulators.
Among the most important uncertainties that we treat implicitly or ignore are market structure, the regulation of conventional pollutants, and technological change. We ignore the continuing uncertainty about the structure of electric markets and the interaction of electric markets with transmission services. That is, we assume that an operator aims to minimize the cost of generation which operates in a fixed segment of the load/dispatch curve.
Regulation of sulfur, nitrogen oxides and particulates were revised in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, but enforcement is confounded by legal battles over New Source Review (Dewitt and Lee 2003) . Moreover, title III of the Act identified a large class of 'air toxics', and in 2000 the US-EPA mandated restrictions on mercury emissions, the first of the air toxics to be regulated. Whatever the specific evolution of the regulations, we assume that restrictions on conventional pollutants and air toxics will force operators to retire, or retrofit at significant expense, many of the older coal-fired power plants within the next two decades. Because our focus is on restrictions of CO 2 emissions, which we assume will require significantly higher compliance costs than will be required to comply with restrictions on conventional air pollutants, we simplify the analysis by foregoing a detailed treatment of air pollution regulations. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model and specific modeling assumptions, Section 3 examines model results and capabilities, Section 4 contains concluding remarks, and the Appendix presents the mathematical details of the stochastic dynamic programming model and discusses model solution methodologies.
The Model
We model a deregulated private power generation firm that seeks to minimize the expected present value cost of supplying a constant amount of electric power over a specified time horizon by deciding on the timing and technology type of power plant investment under market uncertainty in future natural gas prices and regulatory uncertainty over future CO 2 emissions.
The problem is formulated as a discrete time stochastic dynamic programming problem and solved based on Bellman's Principal of Optimality: "An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision (Bellman 1957) ." Stochastic dynamic programming implicitly models all of the multiple, interacting, sequential real options that characterize the timing and technological choice of irreversible investments under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Each time period, based on all information available at that time, the model analyzes all available investment decisions, including the option to delay investment, the option to invest in any technology, the option to purchase a later option for cost-effective retrofit, the option to retrofit a technology, and the option to abandon one technology and replace it with another.
In a finite time horizon problem, Bellman's principal is recursively implemented by backward induction beginning with the final period decision. The stochastic nature of the problem renders the optimal investment policy a contingent policy, contingent on the realized history of the stochastic natural gas price and CO 2 regulation variables at the time investment decisions are undertaken.
Technology Choices and their Rationale
The power generation technologies considered by the model are described in Table 1 . In all cases, we assume the firm enters the investment decision-making process with a pre-existing pulverized coal (PC) plant with characteristics that reflect typical values for large plants constructed two or three decades ago. This initial plant has no post-combustion SO x or NO x controls. We assume that the operator will be required to retrofit advanced post-combustion control technology over the next few decades or pay for emissions permits that reflect the amortized cost of such controls at the marginal plant in the industry. Rather than modeling these technologies explicitly, we raise the growth rate of fixed operations and maintenance cost (FOM) for pre-existing PC relative to other technologies by an amount that roughly reflects the cost of advanced post-combustion emission controls amortized over a 15-year time horizon. This parameterization essentially forces the retirement of the initial PC plant within two decades.
In addition to natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), the type of natural gas-fired power plant that would compete against coal for baseload power generation, we consider Pre-investment will be preferred if the additional cost of pre-investment is more than compensated by the expected discounted savings of later lower cost retrofit, taking into account both the probability that the stringency of the carbon regulation will induce retrofit and the uncertain timing of regulation implementation Given the carbon price The only natural gas power plant considered is a high-efficiency combined cycle design with a 55% (HHV) efficiency that roughly corresponds to General Electric's new "H"-class system.
All plants are assumed to operate at a fixed capacity factor of 70%. Ignoring the load-demand curve and the heterogeneity of plant dispatch is an enormous simplification, one that allows us to treat uncertainties in gas prices and carbon taxes explicitly. One may view the model as simulating one segment of the load curve in a real electric power system. The 70% capacity factor is slightly higher than the current U.S. average; it is a reasonable number for new plants with high capital and low operating costs (Johnson and Keith 2004 implementation of CO 2 regulations in model periods 1 to 5, corresponding to 5-year time steps from 2010 to 2030. We assume a higher 2/3 probability that a lower $50/tC tax will be implemented and a lower 1/3 probability that a stringent $200/tC tax will occur. Once taxes appear they do not change in the remainder of the 40-year horizon focus of our model. The model can be readily modified to incorporate other parameter values and delay of the uncertain onset of the tax.
Natural Gas Price Assumptions
Natural gas price is assumed to evolve by Brownian motion with constant drift
where α is the annual drift parameter, σ 2 is the annual variance parameter, and ε t has a standard normal distribution 3 . These assumptions yield a continuous probability distribution for P NG with expected price changes of α∆t and price variance of σ 2 ∆t for period length ∆t. For our base case, we assume an initial natural gas price of $4/GJ, annual drift of $0.1/GJ, and a standard deviation (σ) of $0.2/GJ. While there is a wide divergence in forecasts from different sources, these values approximate the long-term trend forecast in the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2005) and the recent volatility in natural gas prices.
Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model
Investment decisions are made each period over a finite time horizon. At any time t, a four-dimensional state vector s t describes the technology type and the plant age of the firm's existing generation facility, as well as the current prices of natural gas and carbon emissions. The firm observes the current state and takes investment action a t from among the available alternatives, which include keeping the existing technology plant, investing in a new plant, or retrofitting the existing plant with CCS.
Finite time horizon stochastic dynamic programming is implemented with a recursive equation which expresses Bellman's Optimality Principle that the minimum expected cost to the end of the time horizon depends on the cost of the current period action plus the discounted minimum cost of all future optimal actions from the resulting state next period to the end of the time horizon.
Let the value function V t (s t ) represent the minimum expected cost to the end of time horizon from state s t at time t, and let c(s t , a t ) be the current period cost given state s t and decision a t . The discount factor is β. Then beginning at the terminal time period, the state contingent value functions and optimal investment decisions for all prior periods are derived by backward induction using the recursive equation
where the integral calculates the expected minimum cost of optimal decisions to the end of the time horizon from state s t+1 at time t+1 based on information available at time t, namely state s t and the action a t taken at that time 4 , and
is the probability density function of the transition to the next period state conditional on the current period state and action.
Finally, V 0 (s 0 ) the minimum expected present value cost to the end of the time horizon from t = 0 can be obtained by evaluating the current period value function V 0 at the observed initial state vector s 0 . The optimal investment policy resulting from Equation (3) is a contingent decision sequence,
optimal actions), contingent on the observed future period realizations of the state vector.
Mathematical details are provided in the appendix.
Expected Value of Perfect Regulatory Information
To understand the impact of regulatory uncertainty on private investment decisions and private costs, and in turn the social cost consequences of these private decisions, we calculate the expected value of perfect regulatory information (EVPRI).
Since market uncertainty in natural gas prices will remain irresolvable, this close analog to the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) compares the expected present value cost of optimal investment decisions under full market and regulatory uncertainty to the lower expected present value cost deriving from investment decisions made with continuing stochastic gas prices but perfect information about future CO 2 regulations over the same probability distribution of possible future CO 2 regulation time paths.
For each possible perfect information regulatory time path, a sequence of statecontingent value functions are derived by backward induction as in Equation (3), yielding a separate contingent optimal investment policy for each regulatory path. We then calculate the overall expected minimum cost under perfect regulatory information by weighting the minimum cost of optimal decision making along each regulatory time path by its probability. Subtracting this value from the higher expected minimum cost under the full stochastic model results in the EVPRI measure of the private cost of regulatory uncertainty. Mathematical details are provided in the appendix.
Social Cost of Private Decisions
Since evaluating the benefits of reducing climate change damages through CO 2 emissions abatement is far beyond the scope of this study, we seek to develop a measure to assess the tradeoffs between higher electricity production costs and lower emissions, a In a dynamic setting, a single measure must somehow aggregate costs and emissions across time. While discounting costs across time is commonly accepted practice, an emerging consensus from the forest sequestration literature also discounts future emissions abatement (Stavins 1999; Richards and Stokes 2004) .
While there exists a long and largely unresolved debate in the literature over the divergence of private and social discount rates (Lind, Arrow et al. 1982) , no one analyzing the social costs and benefits of climate change policy in a dynamic setting uses a discount rate anywhere near the 14% rate commonly used in private investment decisions in the deregulated power generation industry 5 . The benefits to society of CO 2 abatement and eventual reductions in damages from climate change are more commonly discounted at social discount rates in the range of 0% to 6% (Metz, Davidson et al. 2001 ).
Since our goal is to analyze the societal consequences of regulatory policy uncertainty on private decision making, we retain private industry discount rates while modeling investment decision making but evaluate the social costs resulting from these private decisions at a social discount rate of 4%.
We calculate the expected present value social cost of electricity generation by evaluating the costs resulting from private decision making at the social discount rate over the model time horizon for both the baseline no regulation and uncertain regulation cases. The social cost of emissions abatement is simply the difference between the two.
These social costs include all the terms in the cost function of Equation (1) except the emissions tax cost since these are just transfer payments.
An analogous calculation, comparing emissions time paths between the baseline no regulation and uncertain regulation cases, is made to calculate the expected present value quantity of emissions abatement discounted at the social discount rate. Dividing the expected present value social cost of emissions abatement by the expected present value quantity of emissions abatement yields a measure of abatement policy cost effectiveness. While discounting emissions reductions is an inexact surrogate for ameliorating future climate change damages, since it is equivalent to assuming that the marginal damage of all future emissions remains constant (Stavins 1999; Richards and 5 Capital asset pricing model theory indicates that the private discount rate should only exceed the risk-free discount rate for non-diversifiable shareholder risk, however, as suggested by Arrow and Lind (1970) , an agency problem exists since managers may discount for shareholder diversifiable risk (contrary to shareholder interests) because the manager's income and career depend on firm specific success. Further investigation of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, placing our analysis in the broader context of differing approaches, this cost-effectiveness measure is based on a bottom-up engineering analysis which is necessarily a supply-side, partial equilibrium measure because it does not capture any demand side adjustment to rising electricity prices due to CO 2 regulations or any other indirect impacts on the economy at large through changing prices in other sectors characteristic of general equilibrium modeling (Rose and Oladosu 2002) . The measure also does not consider any potential tax revenue recycling advantages from replacing distortionary taxes with an externality tax (Parry, Williams et al. 1999) . Finally, this measure does not consider any secondary environmental benefits such as reduction of other types of pollution.
Model Results
The backward induction model (Equation 3) calculates the minimum expected present value cost of electricity generation V 0 (s 0 ) as well as the optimal contingent investment policy. Forward calculations combining this optimal investment policy with the inter-period transition probabilities of the state vector yield the future utilization probability distributions of different power generation technologies. Close study of the evolution of these distributions demonstrates the operation of the model and provides insight into the economic incentives that drive firm technology choice.
We then investigate the value of technological adaptability in the face of regulatory uncertainty by restricting the firm's ability to retrofit for CCS, examine the importance of technological adoption risk through sensitivity analysis on the IGCC cost risk premium, and determine the expected value of the private cost imposed on firms due to regulatory uncertainty by calculating the expected value of perfect regulatory information.
Following this analysis on private decision making and impacts, we expand the analysis to consider social costs and regulatory effectiveness. In this analysis, we investigate how private firm decisions in all model variations impact expected CO 2 emissions streams and electricity production costs, as well as an abatement costeffectiveness measure that enumerates the tradeoffs between the two.
Full Stochastic Model with Retrofit
Consider the optimal investment decisions and attendant emissions in the context of the full stochastic model with retrofit flexibility. With model parameters as given in Table 1 and a base case IGCC cost risk premium of $50 per kW of capacity, we calculate a minimum expected private present value cost of $1990 million, of which $120 million is carbon taxes, for a power generation firm with a hypothetical 1000MW facility consisting of two 500MW plants (See Table 2 ).
At the first decision period in 2005, the firm optimally decides to retain the existing coal-fired generation technology with certainty. Beyond this time, the P NG and P C dimensions of the state vector evolve stochastically yielding state contingent optimal investment decisions that depend on the observed value of these prices at the time decisions are made. Figures 1(a-c) reveal some of the probabilistic evolutionary detail of investment decisions by presenting a dynamic sequence of optimal technology probability distributions across the P NG and P C dimensions. These distributions aggregate the probability of observing an optimal technology in each (P In 2010 (Figure 1a) , if no CO 2 regulations are implemented (P C = $0/tC which occurs with probability 80%), then the pre-existing PC plant is retained for all gas prices.
Alternatively, if regulators implement low carbon prices (P C = $50/tC with probability of 13.3%) and low natural gas prices are realized, then new NGCC plants are built to minimize the present value of expected generation and emissions costs going forward;
however, at higher natural gas prices, the low carbon price does not induce retirement of the pre-existing coal-fired generation capacity. Finally, if regulators implement high carbon prices (P C = $200/tC with 6.7% probability), building new NGCC at low natural gas prices and building new IGCC+CCS plants at high realized natural gas prices minimizes future discounted generation and emissions costs. Thus, CO 2 regulation induces the early retirement of existing high-emissions coal-fired capacity with high carbon prices, but only partial retirement will be observed if low carbon prices prevail in 2010.
In 2015 (Figure 1b) , the rising cost of maintaining the pre-existing PC plant induces investment in new technologies in most cases, except over an intermediate interval of natural gas prices with zero carbon price. In this interval, the real option value of delaying new investment and paying the rapidly rising fixed operating costs of the preexisting PC plant until more information becomes available is decisive in delaying retirement. If gas prices remain in this range next period, the firm will replace this pre-existing PC plant with IGCC without CCS at zero carbon price, with NGCC at low carbon price, and with IGCC+CCS at the high carbon price. At gas prices below this intermediate interval, NGCC is the preferred technology while at gas prices above this interval, the firm builds an IGCC plant.
In general, with perfect foresight, if the future is foreseen to include both high gas and carbon prices, IGCC+CCS will be the preferred technology. If the future is expected to be one of high-gas and low-carbon prices ($50/tC), then APC will be preferred to IGCC without CCS solely due to the positive IGCC cost risk premium.
In the decision making under uncertainty, there are seven interacting factors that come into play in choosing the optimal investment at high gas prices: (i) the very low probability that future natural gas prices will become low enough to invest in NGCC;
(ii) the rapidly rising fixed operating costs of retaining the pre-existing PC plant; (iii) the relative future transition probabilities to the low $50/tC or high $200/tC carbon prices;
(iv) the advantage of being able to cost effectively retrofit IGCC for CCS at high carbon prices; (v) the cost risk premium disadvantage of IGCC without CCS relative to APC at a $50/tC carbon price; (vi) the real option value of delaying investment to learn the CO 2 regulation state next period; and (vii) the discount rate.
Now returning to the case at hand-zero carbon price and high gas prices in 2015.
The firm optimally invests in IGCC because the loss of the option value of delaying investment and the cost of the real option to retrofit IGCC, which will not be exercised with 2/3 probability in future (the $50/tC carbon state), is more than offset by the savings from avoiding the rapidly rising FOM of the pre-existing PC plant and the value of the real option to retrofit IGCC in the 1/3-probablity $200/tC carbon state. There is a continued shift of probability from the no regulation state to the two regulation states in 2020 ( Figure 1c ) and beyond, with the technology probability distributions becoming ever more complex due to aggregation of additional transition Over the remainder of the time horizon, the probability of observing IGCC without CCS declines to 36% as it is CCS retrofitted if a $200/tC carbon price is realized; the probability of IGCC+CCS increases to nearly 33% both through retrofits and direct future investment in IGCC+CCS, the probability of NGCC generation peaks at 15% in 2020 and is then gradually replaced by APC in the $50/tC state as the expected price of natural gas increases.
The expected CO 2 emissions time path can now be calculated by combining probabilistic time paths of each technology and the emissions rate of each technology from Table 1 . Figure 2 compares this expected emissions time path to the baseline expected emissions time path calculated with irresolvable natural gas price uncertainty but a certain future of zero carbon taxes. Over the 40-year study horizon, the probabilistically specified uncertain CO 2 regulation reduces carbon emissions by only 20% or 12.2 million metric tons of carbon. The impact of retrofit flexibility on emissions is discussed in the next section.
The Value of Retrofit Flexibility to Firms
We assess the value of retrofit flexibility from the firm's perspective by rerunning the model without the option of investing in IGCC without CCS. The elimination of retrofits modestly decreases expected present value costs by $6 million or 0.3% (Table   2 ). The difference in present value costs is quite small because the value afforded by flexibility under uncertainty most significantly alters decisions 10 to 25 years in the future where the discount factor declines from 0.27 to 0.04 with a 14% discount rate.
The impact of retrofit flexibility on technology choice and emissions is more significant. Without flexibility, there is an expected delay in retirement of the aging preexisting PC fleet over both the retrofit and baseline no regulation cases. As seen in Figure 2 , uncertain future regulations without retrofit flexibility raises expected emissions above the no regulation case in 2015, as firms delay investment awaiting indication of the stringency of future regulations. On the other hand, the inability to retrofit also induces a slightly higher probability of early investment in NGCC. After 2015 the rapidly rising FOM of the pre-existing PC plants and the continued resolution of regulatory uncertainty cause retirement of all pre-existing PC plants, and beyond 2020 expected emissions without retrofit flexibility are slightly below the retrofit case owing to the higher probability of NGCC generation. However, as seen in the next section, the effect of retrofit flexibility on the social cost effectiveness of emissions abatement can be substantial when combining the net effect on emissions with an evaluation of future power generation costs at the social discount rate.
Social Cost Effectiveness of Abatement
Evaluation of private investment decisions at the social discount rate produces a much higher expected present value social cost of $4117 million because future costs are given greater weight. To ascertain the social cost effectiveness of abatement with the probabilistic regulatory specification, we calculate the expected cost increase and the expected emissions decrease in comparison to the no regulation case.
Under the full stochastic model, the social expected present value electricity generation costs rise by $400 million above the no regulation case and the expected present value carbon emissions decline by 5.2 million metric tons yielding an effective abatement cost of $76/tC (see Table 2 ). Technological adaptability has a substantial impact on social costs: without retrofit flexibility abatement costs increase by 57%. The steps reflect technological "tipping points" where the optimal technology switches discontinuously based on the relative competitiveness of APC versus IGCC as the replacement for pre-existing PC plants prior to CO 2 regulation at different times. The impacts on abatement cost effectiveness result from the two different components of the cost-effectiveness calculation: the first step is characterized by an abatement reduction while the second step is characterized by a cost increase.
Below the first step, as the IGCC cost risk premium increases from zero to $50/kW, the increasing slope derives from the higher probability of delay in retirement of the pre-existing, high emissions PC plant. At zero cost risk premium, all pre-existing PC is retired by 2015. In this case, the ability to retrofit substantially reduces the cost of abatement should a $200/tC tax occur and there is no cost penalty over APC should a $50/tC tax occur, a tax too low to induce CCS retrofitting of IGCC. As the IGCC cost risk premium rises to $50/kW, the cost penalty of IGCC over APC, which would be realized with the 2/3 probability of a future $50/tC tax state, raises the probability of 
Social Cost of Regulatory Uncertainty
To examine the consequences of regulatory uncertainty on both firm decision making and eventual regulatory effectiveness, we compare the uncertain case to two specifications with uncertainty removed. First, since policy makers possess the ability to remove regulatory uncertainty, we model the simple case where regulators commit to a carbon tax that matches the expected value of the tax in our stochastic model. Second, we calculate the expected value of perfect regulatory information as discussed in Section 2.5.
As a conceptually simple comparison case, we assume that regulator's implement a carbon tax that ramps linearly from zero to $100/tC in 2030 and is constant thereafter.
This corresponds to the expected value in our stochastic model (Section 2.2), although none of the stochastic carbon tax trajectories follow this path. This tax specification produces much greater reductions in emissions than does the stochastic case (Figure 2 ).
Emissions abatement is increased by 88%, while the social unit cost of abatement increases by 8% (Table 2 ). Both effects result from substantial changes in technology choice as compared to the full stochastic case. Under the deterministic regulation ramp case, foresight on carbon prices above $80/tC eliminates any investment in APC. As carbon prices ramp up, all pre-existing PC is retired by 2015 when the carbon tax reaches $40/tC, replaced with 40% probability by NGCC and 60% by IGCC with pre-investment for CCS. Installed IGCC is retrofitted with CCS once the carbon tax reaches $80/tC in 2025, and by the end of the time horizon, the probability of NGCC declines to 13% while IGCC+CCS climbs to 87% as rising gas prices lead to abandonment of transitional NGCC plants.
The expected value of perfect regulatory information (EVPRI) provides a more rigorous measure of the cost of regulatory uncertainty. With the ability to retrofit, the EVPRI is quite small in relation to the total cost from both the private and social perspective: $5 million and $40 million, respectively, as seen in Table 2 when the IGCC cost risk premium is $50/kW. However, firm decision making under perfect regulatory information reduces by 10% the expected social cost of abatement, the measure that most accurately reflects the tradeoff between electricity generation cost and emissions.
Moreover, without the flexibility of retrofits, the EVPRI from the social perspective rises to $142 million, and perfect regulatory information lowers the expected social cost of abatement by 32%.
To further explore this issue, we include the plots for the expected social cost of abatement as a function of the IGCC cost risk premium under perfect regulatory information in Figure 3 . At very low cost risk premiums, the gains from making investment decisions under perfect regulatory information as measured by the social cost effectiveness of abatement are quite small because the flexibility afforded by retrofits can effectively neutralize the impact of regulatory uncertainty However, as the purchase price of the IGCC retrofit flexibility option reflected in the cost risk premium rises above $60/kW, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on abatement cost effectiveness becomes significant. Now under regulatory uncertainty, there is a higher probability of delaying the retirement of pre-existing PC facilities raising expected emissions coupled with higher expected costs of eventual investment in IGCC without CCS.
On the other hand, the decision-making flexibility accorded each regulatory time path under the perfect information construct does not result in delaying aging PC replacement with APC on all regulatory time paths with 2/3 total probability that lead to an eventual $50/tC carbon tax; PC retirement delays are only optimal on time paths that lead to a $200/tC carbon tax. Therefore, the fact that this asymmetric delay in plant retirement is unobtainable under regulatory uncertainty raises the social cost of abatement by between 38% and 61%.
Without the ability to retrofit, regulatory uncertainty is consistently detrimental to the expected cost effectiveness of future regulations, even at low IGCC cost risk premiums. Over the full range of cost risk premiums considered, regulatory uncertainty raises the social cost of abatement a consistent 42% to 48%.
Sensitivity to Natural Gas Price
Given both the volatility in natural gas prices and the boom-and-bust investment in NGCC plants during the 1990s (Lapson and Hunter 2004) , the impact of future natural gas prices holds particular interest. In our standard scenario, natural gas prices are high enough to limit the penetration of NGCC plants to a peak of 15% probability ( Figure 1d) ; we therefore explore a lower gas price scenario, as might occur if LNG imports moderated prices, in which the annual gas price drift is reduced from $0.10/GJ to $0.05/GJ while maintaining the same random-walk variance.
In the low gas price scenario, gas generation plays a much larger role with the penetration of NGCC plants peaking at 50% probability in the full stochastic model with retrofits. Even under the low gas price scenario, the penetration of gas capacity is driven by expectations of future carbon constraints: in a zero carbon price future, penetration of NGCC peaks at only 13% probability. This suggests that carbon constraint expectations, in conjunction with expectations of low gas prices, may have played some role in driving recent construction of gas capacity.
Gas price assumptions interact with IGCC competitiveness and retrofit flexibility to constrain the cost effectiveness of regulations. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the gas price drift rate assumption on regulatory cost effectiveness as a function of the IGCC cost risk premium.
In the absence of retrofit flexibility (or under high IGCC cost risk premiums), firms can use a NGCC low capital-cost bridging strategy while they await certainty about the level of the carbon constraint. Firms that must retire their PC assets can then wait to choose between APC or IGCC+CCS once they know the carbon constraint, or if gas prices remain low they can retain NGCC. At high natural gas prices, the use of gas as a bridging strategy is constrained, driving the social cost effectiveness of regulation down and the cost of regulatory uncertainty up.
Conversely, if retrofit flexibility is available and competitive (low or zero IGCC cost risk premiums), then the gas price ramp has little impact on the social cost effectiveness of abatement even though gas prices affect the technological means and timing of abatement. From the firm's perspective IGCC retrofits and NGCC with low gas prices are substitutable or alternative means of managing the carbon price uncertainty. If both are eliminated (high gas prices and IGCC premium) then the social cost of abatement rises dramatically.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In all cases regulatory uncertainty raises the social cost of abatement (defined as present value cost per unit of carbon); however, the cost of regulatory uncertainty is strongly dependent on the competitiveness of generation technologies with low cost carbon capture retrofits and on the competitiveness of using natural gas as a 'bridging strategy'. If a technology with low cost retrofit flexibility adds little to initial capital cost (low IGCC cost risk premium in our model), then regulatory uncertainty does not significantly increase abatement cost. Alternatively, if natural gas prices are expected to have a low growth rate, then natural gas generation offers a low capital cost 'bridging strategy' that can significantly lower the social cost of regulatory uncertainty.
Conversely, if the ability to retrofit is restricted and natural gas price expectations are high, then regulatory uncertainty causes firms to delay retirement of pre-existing, high emissions PC plants, temporarily raising emissions above even the certain no regulation case, and greatly increasing social abatement cost.
A few caveats are particularly salient. First, while the exact results reported here depend, of course, on assumptions about technology cost and performance, we anticipate that the interplay between the cost of regulatory uncertainty and the ability to manage that uncertainty though retrofits or use of low-capital cost natural gas generation is robust.
Second, with respect to IGCC and CCS costs, we have used costs that are slightly lower than would likely apply to the first projects in the North American market, perhaps slightly underestimating abatement costs. We have, however, ignored technological change that may reduce costs and the possibility that gasification projects might be able to use the turbines and steam systems from NGCC plants, potentially lowering costs.
Third, we have ignored correlations between natural gas and carbon prices. All else equal, a rise in carbon prices will encourage fuel switching from coal to natural gas.
Such an effect might be felt almost instantaneously as the change in the relative fuel prices reshuffles the economic dispatch order in electric markets. The increase in electricity prices resulting from arising carbon price would have complex macroeconomic effects, but adopting the (reasonable) assumption that interfuel substitution will be more elastic than electricity demand it seems likely that the two prices will be positively correlated. Such correlations would make natural gas a less attractive option, reducing the already low probability of NGCC investment in our base model and could significantly affect the results of our low natural gas price case.
In the current policy environment, if regulators anticipate that restriction of CO 2 emissions will be necessary to manage climate change, yet foresee continued delay in implementing CO 2 regulations, then they should pursue strategies that improve the cost- 
Appendix -Mathematical Details

Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model
Let t = {0, 1, 2, …, T} be the set of time periods. T investment decisions are made in periods 0, 1, …, T -1. At any time t, a four-dimensional state vector s t describes the electricity generation firm's current situation where s t ∈ S, the state space (the set of possible states). Then beginning implementation of Bellman's Optimality Principle with the period prior to the termination time T, the minimum cost to the end of the time horizon is
where Ω(s T ) represents the terminal value of the electricity generation plant given Finally, V 0 (s 0 ) the minimum expected present value cost to the end of the time horizon from t = 0 can be obtained by evaluating the current value function V 0 at the observed initial state vector s 0 . The optimal investment policy resulting from the actions that minimize cost in Equation (A3) is a contingent decision sequence, contingent on the observed future period realizations of the state vector.
Random Variable Assumptions
The natural gas price component of the probability density function is based on an The carbon price component of the probability density function is based on discrete distribution assumptions for both the timing and magnitude of a carbon tax. For simplicity, the carbon tax can take on two possible magnitudes: a low $50/tC or a more stringent $200/tC. When a regulation is adopted let q equal the probability of a low carbon price and 1 -q equal the probability of a high carbon price. The base case assumes q equals 2/3. The distribution for the timing of the carbon tax is based on an a priori 20% probability for implementation of CO 2 regulations in periods t = 1 to 5 corresponding to 5-year time intervals beginning in 2010 to 2030. After implementation, the magnitude of the carbon price remains at either $50/tC or $200/tC.
At the beginning of the time horizon, let p(t) be the probability that CO 2 regulation will be adopted at the beginning of period t, for t = 1, 2, …, T-1. Once adopted, the regulation is assumed to remain the same to the end of the time horizon. If the regulation is not adopted in any period, the probability of adoption is updated the next
T t t p t t t pt
to maintain the a priori probability of regulation implementation each period.
Model Solution Methodology
The conditional transition probabilities of the state vector in equation (A3) are a mixture of continuous and discrete probabilities corresponding to the different dimensions of the state vector. The technology and plant age components of the transition between periods are deterministic based on the prior period state and investment decision. The P C dimension transition is modeled as discrete and the integral with respect to this dimension becomes a simple summation. On the other hand, the continuous P NG dimension necessitates numerical approximation of the value function V over this dimension.
A smooth approximation of the value function using piecewise cubic interpolation over a grid { } by a deterministic drift plus a random shock with a normal distribution, there will always be some positive probability beyond the range of the partition. This is accounted for by adding a discrete probability at either end of the grid space equal to the tail probability and verifying that these boundary effects do not significantly impact the overall integration. Choice of eliminates unrealistic negative prices. 
Expected Value of Perfect Regulatory Information
To derive the expected value of perfect regulatory information (EVPRI), let the 
where the expectation operator E is now over only uncertain future natural gas prices. 
where the expectation in the second term on the right hand side is over all carbon price paths indexed by i. 
